“If a claimant wishes to benefit from the provisions of paragraph 7.13 to 7.22 (and by doing so be paid an interim payment), he or she must obtain a stay under paragraph 7.12. This, to my mind, is the natural reading of the Protocol. It is also entirely understandable why the drafters of the Protocol would wish to restrict a claimant’s ability to seek interim payments under paragraphs 7.13 and 7.18 to certain defined circumstances (namely, those that are set out in paragraph 7.12)…. it must follow that the Claimant wrongly exited the Portal.”
The Claimant solicitors acted for the Claimant in matrimonial proceedings between November 2013 and September 2018. Following a “long history of protracted, difficult litigation” including a divorce suit, ancillary relief and Family Law Act non-molestation and occupation order applications the Claimant faced total legal costs in the sum of £263,426.11.
In the course of the costs budgeting exercise the Claimants had complained, in particular, about the level of the Defendant’s incurred and estimated disclosure costs and asked the court both comments on those incurred and significantly curtail, if not disallow altogether, the costs of disclosure going forward.
Whilst the normal rule in welfare cases in the Court of Protection is that there should be no order as to costs, this does not apply to appeals from the Court of Protection which are governed by CPR Part 44: Cheshire West v P  EWCA Civ 1333.
In the case of an insolvent company involved in litigation which has resulted in a costs liability that the company cannot pay, a director of that company may be made the subject of such an order. Although such instances will necessarily be rare (Taylor v Pace Developments  BCC 406), s.51 orders may be made to avoid the injustice of an individual director hiding behind a corporate identity, so as to engage in risk-free litigation for his own purposes (Re North West Holdings PLC and Anr  EWCA Civ 67). Such an order does not impinge on the principle of limited liability: Dymocks; Goodwood; Threlfall.
Where a person gives notification of a claim under the Protocol but thereafter dies before its conclusion and the notified claim then settles on behalf his Estate pre-issue, are the costs and disbursements payable by the defendant to be calculated by reference to Section IIIA (or III) of CPR 45? Or are they to be calculated by reference to the generally more favourable Section II of CPR 45?
In setting the reciprocal cap, it is necessary to bear in mind that in judicial review a claimant’s costs can generally be expected to be higher than a defendant’s (assuming representation of equivalent seniority). This is because the preparatory work of collating the evidence supporting a claim and of formulating the submissions to advance it is usually (though not always) more time-consuming than the work of producing responsive submissions and evidence.
The consequences of Part 36 can be punishing, but it is a separate question whether they are unjust. The justice of Part 36 is that decisions about litigation should be economically utilitarian: it actively discourages litigation on ‘points of principle’ by making litigation not fought on a commercial basis a high stakes activity.
We recently reported the decision of Mr Justice Foxton in Serbian Orthodox Church – Serbian Patriarchy v Kesar & Co  EWHC 1205 (QB) in which he reinstated a Default Costs Certificate despite invalid email service of the Notice of Commencement.
In Belsner v Cam Legal Services Ltd, Mr Justice Lavender determined that a solicitor who wishes to rely on having been given informed consent for the purposes of CPR 46.9(2) must not only point to a written agreement which meets the requirements of the rule, but must also show that his client gave informed consent to that agreement insofar as it permitted payment to the solicitor of an amount of costs greater than that which the client could have recovered from another party to the proceedings.