…we do not consider that the well- established jurisdiction to direct set-off of costs against costs under rule 44.12 is displaced by the QOCS scheme, provided that there is an order for damages or interest and that the headroom provided by that order has not been exhausted by other means of enforcement. But for the reasons already given we do not accept the submission that it is only the net costs entitlement that has to be brought into account under rule 44.12(1)
About Toby Moreton
Entries by Toby Moreton
“…as a matter of ordinary interpretation, bearing in mind the purpose of certification, it is implicit that the solicitor who signs the certificates must be readily identifiable on the face of those certificates. It is inherent in the concept of certifying or attesting to a matter before a court of law, at least in circumstances where the CPR requires (as it does here) that a matter is certified or attested by an individual, that the signatory should disclose their identity to the court.”
I am satisfied that on reviewing the facts of this case, bearing in mind an accident in 2015, a letter of claim on 26 May 2017, coupled with the fact that the second medical evidence does not appear to have been obtained until 15 January 2018, less than three months before the expiry of limitation, to proceed with the claim outside the EL/PL Protocol was unreasonable. In my judgment, the reason for the issue of proceedings on 19 March 2018 was conditioned by the expiry of the limitation period without thought to the benefits of the Protocol and its undoubted relevance in these proceedings.
…where the claimants are seeking a stay of a costs order the investigation that the court needs to undertake is wide and should be demanding. The claimants’ evidence is flimsy, providing little evidence in support or clarity around their financial position or inability to pay as a result of their ill health or Covid-19 or indeed stifling.
“I am satisfied that the Settlement Agreement was a binding contract that superseded the acceptance of the Part 36 Offer. This was because on 26 May 2020 the parties chose to conclude a written settlement agreement with fresh wording and an entire agreement clause. Looking at the parties’ fuller wording in the Settlement Agreement, and taking into account that the Part 36 Offer had been accepted and incorporated by way of an annex, the parties’ objective intention was to provide a fuller settlement agreement, not merely an agreement memorialising the Part 36 Offer
“If a claimant wishes to benefit from the provisions of paragraph 7.13 to 7.22 (and by doing so be paid an interim payment), he or she must obtain a stay under paragraph 7.12. This, to my mind, is the natural reading of the Protocol. It is also entirely understandable why the drafters of the Protocol would wish to restrict a claimant’s ability to seek interim payments under paragraphs 7.13 and 7.18 to certain defined circumstances (namely, those that are set out in paragraph 7.12)…. it must follow that the Claimant wrongly exited the Portal.”
The Claimant solicitors acted for the Claimant in matrimonial proceedings between November 2013 and September 2018. Following a “long history of protracted, difficult litigation” including a divorce suit, ancillary relief and Family Law Act non-molestation and occupation order applications the Claimant faced total legal costs in the sum of £263,426.11.
In the course of the costs budgeting exercise the Claimants had complained, in particular, about the level of the Defendant’s incurred and estimated disclosure costs and asked the court both comments on those incurred and significantly curtail, if not disallow altogether, the costs of disclosure going forward.
Whilst the normal rule in welfare cases in the Court of Protection is that there should be no order as to costs, this does not apply to appeals from the Court of Protection which are governed by CPR Part 44: Cheshire West v P  EWCA Civ 1333.
In the case of an insolvent company involved in litigation which has resulted in a costs liability that the company cannot pay, a director of that company may be made the subject of such an order. Although such instances will necessarily be rare (Taylor v Pace Developments  BCC 406), s.51 orders may be made to avoid the injustice of an individual director hiding behind a corporate identity, so as to engage in risk-free litigation for his own purposes (Re North West Holdings PLC and Anr  EWCA Civ 67). Such an order does not impinge on the principle of limited liability: Dymocks; Goodwood; Threlfall.